

## GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

Good governance and security are essential elements – and indeed prerequisites of – efforts to fight extreme poverty in Africa. Across the continent, the number of countries moving towards good governance is on the rise and the number of countries in conflict is decreasing.

Working with a multitude of interest groups and international partners across sectors to achieve ambitious development outcomes is an incredible challenge for any government. A government that is also riddled with corruption, lacks transparency and accountability and/or is trying to simultaneously address threats to basic security will find the challenge incredibly daunting. Transparent governments that respect the rule of law are more likely to spend scarce resources in ways that are more accountable to their own citizens. The responsibility and the greatest ability to improve governance and security in Africa lie with African leaders, media and civil society, but there is also a role for G8 countries, the private sector and other development partners to play.

‘Governance’ and ‘security’ are broad terms, and in using them in this chapter, DATA refers broadly to the issues of corruption, transparency and general peacekeeping. This chapter does not attempt to go into detail on a number of important issues that also contribute to the overall picture, including small arms, media freedom, judiciaries and budget oversight, to name just a few.

Instead, this chapter evaluates G8 and African commitments at the critical intersection between governance, security and development efforts and progress towards fulfilling them. The breadth and depth of the chapter are, unfortunately, limited by two important factors: concrete and measurable G8 and African commitments in these areas have been somewhat limited and arbitrary; and data sources with which to measure progress towards fulfilling these commitments are also limited. Because the purpose of The DATA Report is to measure progress against actual commitments, this chapter should not be seen as a holistic analysis of G8 and African progress across governance and security as a whole, but rather as an examination of progress on specific commitments.

## IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Over the past 50 years, Africa has seen more than its fair share of disappointing governments. In too many countries, initial optimism following independence was quickly dashed by autocratic and repressive regimes. The past two decades, however, have seen a number of African countries move towards more democratic governments, and a new wave of African leadership is taking hold. In 1989, when the Cold War was drawing to a close, there were just four democracies in sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Senegal. According to updated data from Steve Radelet at The Center for Global Development, there are about 23 democracies in Africa today.<sup>1</sup> It is important, however, to note that there are considerable variations within this group of 23 countries: some are strong and vibrant democracies, while others could better be called ‘borderline’ democracies.<sup>2</sup> The variation between countries points to the need for all stakeholders to approach the question of democracy in Africa with a degree of sophistication.

Despite promising trends, corruption continues to hamper development across the continent. Annually, it is estimated that as much as 25% of the GDP of African states is lost to corruption, amounting to \$148 billion in total.<sup>3</sup> This estimate covers a range of illicit activities, from bribe-taking at lower levels of government, to inflated procurement, to large-scale raiding of public treasuries by political leaders. In many African countries, systems of patronage and nepotism have been well entrenched for decades. Donors play a role in perpetuating the detrimental cycle of corruption through bribe-paying, support to corrupt governments based on strategic interests, failure to regulate multinational corporations and permitting the shelter of stolen assets in banks and non-cooperative offshore financial centres, some of them in developed countries. Shifting the paradigm will require a substantial and sustained political and financial investment by both developing countries and development partners.

### WHAT TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO MEASURE PROGRESS ON GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA?

Recent years have seen the development of various sets of indicators that assess African governance. These include, amongst others, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and World Governance Indicators, the African Monitor’s Initial Monitoring Tools, Freedom House’s Indices of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, the Polity IV Project, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and most recently the Ibrahim Index. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are another potential tool available to track countries’ efforts to improve governance. PRSPs outline a national programme for poverty reduction and are the foundation of the World Bank and IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, under which countries benefit from debt relief. Currently, 28 African countries have completed a PRSP and, of these, 23 have completed at least one follow-up annual report.<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to provide comprehensive data on the ability of PRSPs to track – and ideally improve – governance, but evidence shows that some countries have been able to use the PRSP process to improve government spending and prioritisation, among them Tanzania, Mauritania and Ghana.

The Millennium Challenge Account, a US assistance programme which provides economic and development assistance to high-scoring countries – using its own series of 17 indicators, measuring social spending and economic and political freedoms – is one of several initiatives by donors to channel increased assistance to countries with sound policies. Currently, 9 out of 16

Millennium Challenge 'compacts' are in sub-Saharan Africa and an additional eight African countries have qualified to receive 'threshold' assistance, which provides countries with smaller amounts of funding to improve policies in an effort to attain compact status.<sup>5</sup>

## SELECT G8 COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE AND FIGHT CORRUPTION

The responsibility for improving governance and fighting corruption across the continent ultimately rests with Africans themselves, both inside and outside of governments. However, there is a critical supporting role that G8 nations must play. Recognising the paramount importance of good governance, the G8 and African governments have made a number of commitments – and some notable progress – in recent years towards improving governance in Africa, as outlined below.

### UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (UNCAC)

UNCAC was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2003 and came into force in December 2005. UNCAC is a binding agreement designed to comprehensively deal with corruption by addressing prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation and asset recovery. Currently, 140 countries have signed the UNCAC and 111 of these have also ratified it. Countries that ratify the Convention must agree to establish effective anti-corruption practices and to cooperate with other countries in the global fight against corruption.

#### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, G8 governments pledged to work towards early ratification of UNCAC and effective implementation of it, as well as to establish viable mechanisms within their own administrations to assist asset recovery efforts.

**(PARAGRAPH 14F)**

### PROGRESS

Canada, France, Russia, the UK and the US have all signed and ratified UNCAC. As of February 2008, Italy, Japan and Germany had signed UNCAC but had yet to ratify it. Once a country has ratified the Convention, its government must undertake a number of actions in order to fully comply with it. For example, G8 countries have a role to play in cracking down on the supply side of corruption, by strengthening anti-corruption laws and making the consequences of violating them more severe, both for multinational corporations and for contracting agencies working in developing countries on behalf of donor governments.

Though the specific actions needed vary by country, it is clear that a number of developing countries would benefit from technical assistance to help attain compliance. There is no formal mandatory monitoring mechanism for UNCAC, and current monitoring is limited to a voluntary self-assessment questionnaire. Better monitoring and reporting mechanisms to show countries' efforts to comply with the Convention are needed to ensure that it is actually having an effect on corruption and on country policies. The current dearth of funding, and subsequently of reporting, makes it difficult to assess UNCAC's effectiveness and the progress of the G8 and developing countries in adhering to it.

### THE STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE (STAR)

StAR is a joint initiative by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank to catalyse global action to prioritise and enable asset recovery. The potential pay-offs for asset recovery are significant: it is estimated that \$20–\$40 billion has been stashed overseas by corrupt leaders of poor countries (mostly from Africa), and therefore the rewards of recovering even a relatively small portion of stolen assets are massive.<sup>6</sup>

StAR's Action Plan includes a variety of recommendations for developed and developing countries, including the strengthening of legal, financial and public financial management systems, ratification and implementation of UNCAC, pilot programmes to

provide developing countries with legal and technical assistance and global cooperation to ensure that new financial havens do not replace existing ones.<sup>7</sup> The StAR initiative has the potential to facilitate the recovery of huge sums of money for developing countries; unfortunately, to date, StAR has been underfunded and understaffed and its efficacy has, accordingly, been limited.

### AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)

The APRM was introduced by the African Union (AU) in 2003. It is a voluntary mechanism designed to facilitate peer reviews to help countries improve their governance. To participate, a country agrees to implement the AU Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and complete a self-assessment. The country is then subject to peer review by other African countries and is expected to submit a National Plan of Action (NPOA) and periodic progress reports.

#### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, the G8 committed to support the APRM through contributions to the APRM Secretariat Trust Fund and through coordinated support for implementation of recommendations and country action plans. No specific funding levels were set through these commitments.

**(PARAGRAPH 14A)**

#### PROGRESS

Because the APRM is primarily financed by AU member states and is an African-owned initiative, G8 participation has been and will likely continue to be limited. As of December 2007, the APRM had received a total of \$20.5 million in contributions, \$13.2 million (64%) of which came from member states.<sup>8</sup> Bilateral and multilateral development partners have contributed the balance of \$7.3 million or 36%. More specifically:

UK: The UK has provided \$2 million to the APRM Secretariat Trust Fund and has also provided \$300,000 to the UN Economic Commission for Africa to support the APRM. It has also provided funds through bilateral programmes to support country review processes in Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Uganda.<sup>9</sup>

CANADA: In February 2008 Canada announced pledges of \$5.2 million over two years to the APRM.<sup>10</sup>

GERMANY: At the Heiligendamm Summit, Germany announced it would provide €4 million (\$6.2 million) for the APRM process over the following two years, through technical assistance and a contribution to the APRM Trust Fund. At the country level, Ghana, Kenya, Benin, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda and Senegal are working with the German development agency, GTZ, in the context of the APRM.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to supporting the APRM's infrastructure and mechanisms, G8 countries can support the APRM process by increasing incentives for countries to participate through scaled-up funding to those countries which have gone through the process and begun implementing the proposed reforms.

### EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI)

The EITI is a voluntary initiative designed to improve governance in resource-rich countries through the publication and verification of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. The EITI aims to improve transparency and accountability in the extractive industries by setting a global standard for companies to publish what they pay and governments to disclose what they receive.

#### THE COMMITMENT

At Gleneagles, the G8 pledged to increase support to the EITI and to countries implementing it by providing financial and technical assistance. **(PARAGRAPH 14D)**

## THE COST OF CORRUPTION

# \$148bn

Estimated GDP of African states lost to corruption.

The potential pay-offs for asset recovery are significant: it is estimated that **\$20–\$40 billion** has been stashed overseas by corrupt leaders of poor countries (mostly from Africa).

## PROGRESS

EITI participants have finalised a set of principles and criteria to oversee the deployment of the initiative in host countries and to assist civil society to monitor the process. Currently, there are 22 EITI Candidate Countries, 15 of them are in Africa. The EITI has established an independent validation mechanism to evaluate whether countries are compliant with the EITI minimum criteria.

Many of the multinational corporations in extractive industries are headquartered in G8 countries. To date, only three of the 37 oil, gas and mining companies that have endorsed the EITI have complied with the requirement to report on steps taken to meet the EITI transparency principles (Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and StatoilHydro).<sup>12</sup>

The EITI Multi Donor Trust Fund has received a total of almost \$12.5 million to date. Canada, France, Germany and the UK have made contributions, accounting for \$8.58 million, or almost 69% of all contributions. The UK is the largest contributor to date, providing almost \$6.5 million. Canada has contributed \$1 million to EITI and France has committed \$500,000.<sup>13</sup> Germany has committed a total of \$1 million, \$590,000 of which has been paid in to date. Germany is also providing technical assistance to EITI processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ghana on a bilateral basis.<sup>14</sup> In FY2008, the US appropriated \$3 million to EITI, up from \$1 million in FY2007.

## OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

The OECD Convention came into effect in 1999 and includes all 30 OECD members and seven non-members (Russia is not included and South Africa is the only African member). The Convention requires all signatories to criminalise the bribery of public officials of foreign countries.

## THE COMMITMENT

At Gleneagles, the G8 agreed to reduce bribery in the private sector by rigorously enforcing laws and penalties against bribery, encouraging responsible corporate behaviour and working with governments to ensure prosecution of those engaged in bribery – all in line with the OECD Convention.

**(PARAGRAPH 14H)**

## PROGRESS

Though all G7 countries have ratified the Convention, the quality of implementation and enforcement has varied from country to country, and insufficient data and information make it difficult to assess actual progress in some countries. Over the past several years, the number of countries with 'significant enforcement' of the Convention has been steadily increasing, though there has still been no meaningful enforcement in 20 countries.<sup>15</sup> According to Transparency International, France, Germany, Italy and the US are among 14 countries with significant enforcement of the Convention. In 2007, the US led all signatories with 60 investigations (an increase from 55 in 2006) and 67 prosecutions (an increase from 50 in 2006).<sup>16</sup> In 2007, France had nine prosecutions, Germany had four and Italy had two.<sup>17</sup> There have been no significant prosecutions in Canada, Japan or the UK. Because it is based on a collective commitment to end foreign bribery, the overall success of the Convention will be limited by uneven enforcement across countries. A relatively robust monitoring mechanism for the Convention will continue to need funding to continue monitoring progress effectively.

## SELECT AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE AND FIGHT CORRUPTION

African countries have undertaken a number of initiatives to improve governance and fight corruption through the AU, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),

regional initiatives and international conventions. In addition to regional and continent-wide initiatives, a number of countries have made notable progress in improving internal governance in recent years. According to Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, in 2007 Togo held its first ever genuinely free legislative elections and Mauritania held its first free and fair presidential elections. In addition, two countries formerly in conflict, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, made significant progress towards becoming stable democracies. Unfortunately, these and other improvements in 2007 happened alongside major setbacks for democracy in a number of African countries, including Kenya, DRC and Nigeria.<sup>18</sup>

As the number of African countries moving towards democratic governance has increased, the issue of corruption, in particular, has begun to receive more prominence. It should be noted that increased attention to corruption should not be confused as evidence of a spike in actual corruption, but rather as the result of a more concerted effort to expose it. Several African countries made significant improvements in fighting corruption in 2007, according to Transparency International, including Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland.<sup>19</sup>

## THE CASE OF KENYA

Throughout the months of January and February 2008, Kenya – long considered a beacon of stability within Africa – experienced significant unrest following a flawed presidential election held on 27 December 2007. Frustration over the election outcome served as a spark for underlying historic tension, in particular over inequitable distribution of resources and fertile land. In roughly one month, more than 1,000 people were killed and an estimated 350,000 people were displaced from their homes, with looting, rioting and violence across parts of the country. African leadership and the international community quickly stepped in to stem the tide of violence and put pressure on both sides to negotiate a political compromise.

The conflict in Kenya had costs beyond the loss of life and property. Children missed school, HIV-positive people had their treatment interrupted and some of Kenya's most productive agricultural regions were hit badly during the chaos, with potential long-term effects for internal food security and agricultural exports. The toll on Kenya's economy has been, and will continue to be, high, with both formal and informal businesses significantly affected. The tourism industry, which accounts for 15% of national GDP, was hit particularly hard, with a drop in arrivals of 90% in the month of January alone.<sup>20</sup> The crisis has also had implications for Kenya's neighbours. Because of Kenya's economic and transport importance to the region, food and fuel shortages and price increases spread beyond its borders to neighbouring countries. Refugee populations also raised fears of destabilising effects in border regions.

Though much was lost in Kenya in a very short time, there is a silver lining in that longstanding tensions have been brought out into the open and can now be more directly addressed. The violence was stopped before it got worse, which is a testament on the local level to the millions of Kenyans who refused to join in and, on the international level, to just how effective African leaders can be in pushing for solutions to African problems.

## THE IBRAHIM INDEX

The Ibrahim Index was launched in September 2007 alongside the Ibrahim Award, a unique prize designed to incentivise good governance in Africa. The Index that was released in September 2007 reported on data collected in 2005, as well as comparable baseline sets for 2002 and 2000. It ranks countries based on scores across five measures of the provision of political goods:

- 1 safety and security
- 2 rule of law, transparency and corruption
- 3 participation and human rights
- 4 sustainable economic development
- 5 human development

In turn, these five categories are together composed of 58 measures, capturing both inputs (e.g. formal conventions, treaties) and outputs (e.g. elections, freedom of the press). The Index will be produced annually, allowing for trends over time to be captured.

## THE IBRAHIM INDEX OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

RESULTS BASED ON 2005 DATA

- 1 Mauritius
- 2 Seychelles
- 3 Botswana
- 4 Cape Verde
- 5 South Africa
- 6 Gabon
- 7 Namibia
- 8 Ghana
- 9 Senegal
- 10 São Tomé and Príncipe
- 11 Lesotho
- 12 Malawi
- 13 Benin
- 14 Tanzania
- 15 Kenya

## UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (UNCAC)

To date, 26 African countries have signed and ratified UNCAC; nine additional countries have signed it but not ratified; and a further five countries have ratified it without signing. As seen from the table below, some of the African countries that have signed UNCAC rank notably poorly on indexes that measure transparency and corruption.

### AFRICAN SIGNATORIES TO UNCAC

STATUS	COUNTRY
<b>SIGNED AND RATIFIED</b> (26 COUNTRIES)	Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
<b>RATIFIED ONLY</b> (FIVE COUNTRIES)	Burundi, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania
<b>SIGNED ONLY</b> (NINE COUNTRIES)	Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Swaziland

## AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)

As of January 2008, 28 countries had joined the APRM process – Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.<sup>21</sup>

APRM financing has primarily been provided by participating African member states. As of December 2007, the total

financial contributions received from member states stood at \$13.2 million, representing 64% of total contributions since inception.<sup>22</sup>

By the end of 2007, five countries (Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa and Algeria) had completed their APRM review, established National Plans of Action (NPOAs) and completed annual and biannual monitoring and evaluation reports, detailing achievements and key strengths and challenges faced in implementation.<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, the target to have an additional four countries complete their reviews by the end of 2007 was not met. Benin is expected to finish in 2008, however, and seven other countries are in the advanced stages of their review.<sup>24</sup>

As a result of the APRM process, the Government of Ghana has put in place a number of reforms, including the establishment of a Public Sector Reform Ministry, a Fair Wages Commission, a National Labour Commission and a Ministry of Women's and Children's Affairs. The government has also reformed the tax code to promote investment, outlined a strategy to clarify land demarcation and registration, expanded teacher training opportunities and made basic education free up to age 15.<sup>25</sup> In Kenya, public expenditure has been restructured to increase social sector spending and both an Energy Act and a Micro-Finance Act have been passed. Greater devolution of funds to local authorities is also beginning to happen in Kenya, as a result of recommendations from the APRM process.

## EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI)

As of April 2008, 15 African countries had met the criteria to be candidate EITI countries (out of 17 countries classified as 'resource-rich' in Africa): Cameroon, Republic of Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe and Sierra Leone.<sup>26</sup>

To achieve candidate status, governments must undertake a series of actions, including issuing a public statement of intent, committing to work with civil society and companies, appointing a senior individual to lead efforts, and producing a fully costed, published work plan agreed to with other stakeholders. Which means that the candidate countries then have two years to establish themselves as fully compliant. A country must prepare, disclose and disseminate information on all the material revenues received by its government from the oil, gas and mining sectors, with the full engagement of all stakeholders in that country. At present, no country has been formally validated against these criteria, although many are in the advanced stages of the process. As part of this process, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Mauritania and Ghana have all issued reconciled reports of revenues received against company payments made.

# PEACE AND SECURITY

Over the past half-century, a disproportionate number of Africans have lived through conflict and instability. In 2006, almost half of all the world's high-intensity conflicts were in Africa.<sup>27</sup> However, the number of African countries in conflict has been on the decline since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps not coincidentally, this development has happened alongside progress towards democratic governance, improvements in social indicators and decreases in the frequency and intensity of famines.

According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, the number of highly violent conflicts in Africa declined from 15 in 2006 to nine in 2007, with just two of the nine countries classified as experiencing 'war' (Sudan and Somalia).<sup>28</sup> The costs of these conflicts, both direct and indirect, are numerous. Sexual violence, malnutrition, decreased agricultural productivity, interrupted education and disruption to family structures are just some of the consequences of conflict with far-reaching implications for a country's future, even after the conflict itself has ended. In addition, government spending, which could otherwise have been directed to social sectors, goes into military spending during times of conflict. For most conflicts, the greatest human cost comes not from deaths and injuries sustained in combat, but indirectly from the impact on peoples' health and livelihoods and from disruption of society and the economy. In fact, data from nine African conflicts show that the number of indirect deaths was 14 times greater than the number of deaths occurring in combat.<sup>29</sup>

A recent Oxfam/IANSA/Saferworld report placed the cost for armed conflict in 23 African countries between 1990 and 2005 at \$284 billion. This is an average of \$18 billion per year and represents an average annual loss of 15% of GDP, which is one-and-a-half times the average African spending on health and education combined.<sup>30</sup> These figures are likely to be an underestimation, because they do not take into account the costs of international humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, the economic impact on neighbouring countries or the

enduring economic impact of conflict once it has been officially resolved.

These macroeconomic impacts are massive, but do not tell the story of the dramatic human impacts in affected regions. Compared with peaceful countries, African countries in conflict have, on average:<sup>31</sup>

- 50% more infant deaths;
- 15% more undernourished people;
- 20% more adult illiteracy;
- 2.5 fewer doctors per person.

## SELECT G8 COMMITMENTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY

Africa is the continent largest number of UN peacekeeping personnel, with more than 50,000 participants in large-scale missions in Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia and Sudan.<sup>32</sup> Over the years, the G8 has made a number of statements of intent regarding peace and security in Africa, as well as some important specific commitments. These commitments and statements have addressed a number of different issues, including small arms control, conflict resources, humanitarian assistance, funding for peacekeeping operations and 'forgotten emergencies'. In the 2007 DATA Report, DATA highlighted three specific G8 commitments from the Gleneagles Summit on training peacekeepers, addressing the crisis in Sudan and supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and supporting the African Standby Force. In 2008, we once again examine progress on these pledges, but also examine G8 contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), two entities that the G8 also pledged to support at Gleneagles.

## TRAINING 75,000 PEACEKEEPERS

### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, the G8 committed 'to train and, where appropriate, equip some 75,000 troops by 2010 to take part in peace support operations worldwide with a sustained focus on Africa.'

(PARAGRAPH 8)

### PROGRESS

Incomplete data make it difficult to thoroughly report in a comparable manner on individual countries' progress since the 2005 commitment, although in general donors appear to be on track to meet the goal of 75,000 peacekeepers trained. The following list summarises available data on G8 members' progress.

**CANADA:** Canada's Fund for Africa (originally launched in 2002) includes the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (\$15 million over five years), which includes some financing for peacekeeper training.

**FRANCE:** France supports the participation of Africans in peacekeeping operations through the RECAMP programme (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities). In the context of the European Union, France contributes up to 24.3% of the European Union Peace Facility, which finances African peacekeeping operations with funds from the European Development Fund.

**ITALY:** In 2005, Italy established the Centre for Excellence for Stability Peace Units (COESPU) to train international forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. While COESPU's focus is not exclusively on Africa, it is the region on which the most emphasis is placed. COESPU's target is to train 3,000 senior and mid-level police officials and non-commissioned officers in Italy and an additional 4,000 personnel in their home countries. The estimated cost of running COESPU annually is \$30 million.

**UK:** The UK is aiming to support the training of at least 17,000 African troops by 2010, either directly or through organisations supported by the UK government. Towards this goal, the British government is working specifically in Kenya, Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria.

**US:** The US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was launched at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. It is a five-year programme running from FY2005 to FY2009, with a planned total budget of \$660 million over its lifetime – a rough budget of \$100 million per year. The GPOI's primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. The initiative's largest training component is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme.

As of March 2007, 26,120 peacekeeping trainees and 1,390 trainers had been trained using GPOI funds in sub-Saharan Africa within ACOTA's 18 partner nations, not including soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers.<sup>33</sup> The proposed budget for FY2009 includes funding to train an additional 15,000 peacekeepers in Africa.<sup>34</sup>

In FY2008, the US approved a total of \$2.55 billion for all – UN and non-UN – peacekeeping operations; \$96.4 million of this was for GPOI, of which \$40 million went to ACOTA. In addition, FY2008 funds include support for UN peacekeeping operations in DRC (\$285 million), Liberia (\$180 million), Sudan (\$242 million), and Darfur (UN-AU hybrid mission – \$884 million).

The Administration's request for FY2009 includes a total of \$1.74 billion (including \$106 million for GPOI and \$414 million for the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur) for all peacekeeping operations. Also pending is a request for FY2008 supplemental funds of \$334 million for the UN-AU Darfur operation.

## SUPPORTING THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN

### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, the G8 noted: 'We commend and will continue to support the African Union's mission in Sudan (Darfur).

**(PARAGRAPH 8)**

### PROGRESS

From its inception, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was plagued by financial shortfalls, irregular financing and considerable operational problems – all of this in addition to suffering from significant flaws in the peace process and insufficient international and African will to truly address the crisis in Darfur. In May 2007, the AU declared that AMIS was on the point of collapse, and in July 2007 the UN Security Council approved Security Council Resolution 1769 – the mandate for UNAMID, which will act as a hybrid AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force. UNAMID took over operations from AMIS on 31 December 2007.

Before AMIS was absorbed into UNAMID, it received bilateral support from G8 members, as well as support from organisations to which G8 members contribute, most notably NATO and the EU's Africa Peace Facility (APF). The vast majority of G8 support to AMIS (both bilateral and multilateral) came in the form of in-kind contributions, rather than cash. This resulted in serious operational challenges: much of the donated equipment, for example, was not interoperable and regular funding shortfalls made long-term planning difficult and left troops ill-equipped. The section below provides more detail on G8 and EU contributions to AMIS and the broader effort in Sudan:

CANADA: Canada announced in March 2007 that it would contribute \$45.8 million for continued support to AMIS during the transition period to the hybrid force, bringing its total contribution to AMIS since 2004 to \$227 million.<sup>38</sup>

FRANCE: France pledged €10 million (\$15.5 million) in June 2007 for UNAMID.<sup>35</sup>

GERMANY: Germany pledged €20 million (\$31 million) in March 2007 to efforts in Sudan.<sup>36</sup>

JAPAN: Japan has contributed \$2.1 million to support AMIS, including \$1.4 million for the Joint Commission and Ceasefire Commission and \$130,000 for the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF).<sup>39</sup>

UK: The UK has committed €67 million to AMIS.<sup>37</sup>

US: The US provided more than \$400 million to AMIS from 2004–07 and an estimated \$1 billion in FY2007 funding for humanitarian, development and peacekeeping assistance to Sudan. US support to AMIS has been channelled primarily through private contractors and includes the maintenance of 34 AMIS camps.

EU: Since June 2004, the EU has committed a total of \$334 million to AMIS out of its Africa Peace Facility. In May 2007, the EU announced that it would provide \$54 million to aid the transition from AMIS to UNAMID.<sup>40</sup>

## WILL UNAMID SUCCEED WHERE AMIS FAILED?

Although it is hoped that UNAMID will succeed where AMIS could not, UNAMID is off to a shaky start and looks to be experiencing many of the same challenges that plagued AMIS. UNAMID is currently under-resourced and ill-equipped. As of February 2008, only 9,000 of the estimated 26,000 troops and police required had been deployed. President Bashir's announcement that he would not accept non-African troops has further complicated matters. In addition to troop shortages, UNAMID is suffering significant shortages of equipment and logistical support. Experts are warning that, even if sufficient troop numbers are raised, the peacekeeping mission could fail unless countries can provide the helicopters and lorries that are needed. The UN does not stockpile the kind of sophisticated equipment required for this mission, but relies on wealthier member states for contributions. Specifically, as of February 2008, the force needed six attack helicopters and 18 transport helicopters.<sup>41</sup>

UN member states missed the 31 August 2007 deadline for troop contribution pledges. Pledges were finally sent in October 2007, with an approved budget of \$1.28 billion for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.<sup>42</sup> Germany and Canada are the only G8 countries reported to have contributed police personnel to the operation and the UK is the only G8 country reported to have contributed military personnel.<sup>43</sup>

## SUPPORTING THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF)

The AU began to develop the African Standby Force in 2003 with the goal of establishing an ambitious force to respond to Africa's conflict management requirements by 2010.<sup>44</sup> It will be run out of the AU's Peace and Security Council and financed through a special Peace Fund as well as other donor contributions. The ASF will be composed of battalions and specialised units based in their home countries, equipped and ready for rapid deployment to undertake observation, monitoring and peace support operations. The ASF will also be able to intervene within member states under certain 'grave' circumstances, such as genocide or gross human rights violations, or at the country's request. Once fully operational, the ASF will be able to deploy a self-sustained force with a combined capacity of 15,000–20,000 peacekeepers within 30 days in response to an AU Heads of State mandate. Each of Africa's five regions will have its own brigade, which will be centrally coordinated.

### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, the G8 committed to 'providing coordinated technical assistance to the African Standby Force and helping to establish planning elements at the African Union HQ and its regional brigades.'

**(PARAGRAPH 9A)**

### PROGRESS

It is difficult to assess the contributions of G8 countries to the AU's efforts to operationalise the ASF. Much of the G8 support for the ASF will come in the form of peacekeeper training (discussed above). A number of G8 countries are also providing support to ASF efforts through their support for regional peacekeeping efforts. The US, for example, has provided support to the ECOWAS portion of the ASF, in the form of a logistics adviser assigned to ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, and a depot for peacekeeping operations equipment in Freetown, Sierra Leone. France sponsored a peacekeeping exercise for member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 2007. Germany intends to engage in training ASF police units in 2008 and to provide

support to the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM).<sup>45</sup>

## SUPPORTING THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

The UN Peacebuilding Commission was inaugurated in June 2006, with the aim of marshalling UN resources to improve post-conflict recovery operations. Its scope includes reconstruction, institution building and sustainable development in post-conflict countries. It is hoped that the Commission will bring together all relevant stakeholders in a given situation to fashion a long-term peace-building strategy and to bridge the transition from immediate post-conflict situations to long-term recovery and development strategies. The Commission is made up of an Organisational Committee (composed of 31 member states, selected on a variety of criteria) and country-specific committees that will be convened as needed.

### THE COMMITMENT

In Gleneagles, the G8 committed to 'working in support of the UN Secretary General's proposed new Peace Building Commission.'

(PARAGRAPH 10G)

### PROGRESS

In its first year of operation, the Commission considered the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone and set in motion the process of developing integrated peace-building strategies for each country.<sup>46</sup> The Peacebuilding Commission estimates its annual resource requirements to be \$250 million. By March 2008, the Commission had received pledges for \$248 million, \$226 million of which had been paid in. G8 countries accounted for 42% of this total (\$105 million).

The UK has made the biggest commitment to the Commission to date, pledging almost \$59 million over 2006–08 (\$36 million of which had been paid-in as of March 2008). This is followed by a Japanese contribution of \$20 million and a Canadian pledge of almost \$19 million. The UK and Canadian pledges are both more than each country's

proportionate share. Italy has paid in \$5.8 million and France has paid-in \$2.9 million (both of these figures are lower than each country's proportionate share). Germany announced a \$10 million pledge to the Commission in March 2008; this is two-thirds of its proportionate annual share.<sup>47</sup>

## SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (CERF)

The CERF was officially launched in March 2006 by the UN Secretary-General and is intended to complement – not replace – existing humanitarian funding mechanisms. The CERF is designed to jumpstart critical operations and life-saving programmes not yet funded through other sources. It includes a loan facility of \$50 million and a newly created grant facility of up to \$450 million. The grant facility of the CERF has two components: rapid response grants to promote early action and reduce loss of life; and emergency grants to strengthen humanitarian responses in under-funded crises.

### THE COMMITMENT

While the G8 did not specifically commit to funding the CERF in Gleneagles, they did commit to 'work urgently with other partners to improve the timeliness, predictability, effectiveness and availability of humanitarian assistance by...a) helping to fund sufficiently the urgent needs of millions of Africans caught up in humanitarian emergencies, especially in the so-called 'forgotten humanitarian crises'.

(PARAGRAPH 12)

### PROGRESS

Since its launch on 9 March 2006, the CERF has committed \$595.3 million to humanitarian projects in 59 countries affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. As of March 2008, the grant component of the CERF had received pledges and contributions of more than \$1.1 billion from 93 public and private donors since its launch. This includes pledges made in 2008 of \$424 million from 67 states and three private organisations. The top ten donors to date are the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Ireland, Spain, Germany, Denmark and Australia. The following table

summarises G8 pledges and contributions to the CERF from 2006–08. The UK and Canada have been the two biggest G8 donors to date and have, respectively, pledged/contributed

three and four times their proportionate share (based on GDP) of the \$450 million target for 2008.

### G8 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CERF (\$ MILLION)

	2006	2007	2008		PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF \$450 MILLION ANNUAL TARGET (BASED ON GDP)
	PAID IN	PAID IN	PLEDGES	PAID IN	
CANADA	21.9	35.1	39.6	–	11.8
FRANCE	1.3	1.3	1.5	–	20.9
GERMANY	–	6.6	14.8	14.8	27
ITALY	–	2.7	3	–	17.2
JAPAN	7.5	–	1	–	40.6
RUSSIA	–	–	–	–	9.2
UK	69.9	83.7	80.2	80.2	22.3
US	\$10	–	–	–	122.4
<b>TOTAL G8</b>	<b>110.6</b>	<b>129.4</b>	<b>140.1</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>271.4</b>
<b>TOTAL ALL DONORS</b>	<b>298.7</b>	<b>385.1</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>316.8</b>	<b>450</b>

## AFRICAN PROGRESS ON PEACE AND SECURITY

In recent years, the number of African-driven efforts to address peace and security issues has increased. Today, the African Peace and Security Architecture (created by the AU in 2002) includes the Peace and Security Council of the AU, a Continental Early Warning System, a Panel of the Wise as an enhanced mediation capacity, the African Standby Force and a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework.<sup>48</sup>


African countries make a significant contribution to peacekeeping operations worldwide. In 2007 almost one-quarter of all UN military personnel around the world came

from African countries (22.4%) – second only to personnel provided by Central and South Asia.<sup>49</sup> African countries provide a very high percentage of the troops required for peacekeeping operations within Africa. As the graph on the following page shows, African countries provided 40% of all military contributions to UN and non-UN peace operations located in Africa in 2007.<sup>50</sup> More specifically, African countries provided 33% of all UN military personnel in Africa, and AU troops accounted for 72% of all non-UN military personnel in Africa in 2007.<sup>51</sup> It is important to note, however, that African troops come from a relatively small number of states: Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya have to date provided the bulk of both UN and AU forces.<sup>52</sup>

## COST OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

African countries in conflict have, on average, 50% more infant deaths, 15% more undernourished people, 20% more adult illiteracy and 2.5 fewer doctors per person.

**SOURCE OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN AND NON-UN PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA** (31 OCTOBER 2007)



Several peace support operations have been undertaken by the AU or by sub-regional organisations. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first peacekeeping operation mandated and led by the AU. ECOWAS put in place peacekeeping forces in both Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, in full conformity with AU decisions. A number of missions are currently operational, including in Central African Republic, Comoros, Somalia and the border region of DRC and Rwanda.<sup>53</sup>

A number of African countries have contributed, or will contribute, troops to the hybrid AU-UN mission in Sudan (UNAMID). Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uganda have all sent troops. In addition, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Mali have all pledged to send troops, but they have not yet been deployed (as of 31 December 2007). Ethiopia also recently pledged five of the total of 24 attack and transport helicopters needed by the mission.

Though African contributions on peace and security generally come in the form of troop contributions, a few countries have made contributions to the CERF, including a pledge by South Africa of \$270,000 for 2008 and one by Ghana of \$5,000.

**PROGRESS ON THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF)**

Africa's five regions are in the process of setting up their regional brigades and agreeing on issues of harmonisation and standardisation between the regions. Currently, the brigade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is furthest along in this process. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) will be coordinated from ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, and already ECOWAS member states have taken part in several multilateral peacekeeping exercises. Three other brigades, the Economic Community of Central African States Brigade (CEEACBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), have secured member state contributions and identified and established some headquarters and planning elements. All of these brigades have either taken part in multilateral exercises or plan to do so in the near future. The fifth brigade, the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), should be the furthest along based on the combined military capabilities of its member states, but it has been held back by a lack of regional cooperation and consensus as to how to move forward.